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TOP SECRET

INTERROGATIONS OF OBERST. MUEGGE, O.C. OF N. 4
AND N. 7 OF GERMAN ARMY SIGINT SERVICE.

Attached are notes on three interrogations of Oberst. MUEGGE, carried out on 16th and 17th June, 1945, at SCHLOSS GLUCKSBURG and at the OKM Signal School, FLENSBURG.

TICOM
29 June, 1945

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FIRST INTERVIEW on 16.6.1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Oberst MÜGGE.

Present: Lieut. Luelsan, U.S.A. ...
Major Seaman, A.C.F.
Capt. Loyffe, I.C.
Lt. Kirby, A.C.F.

1. Oberst. MÜGGE gave his history. He was a signals officer, but not a radio intelligence officer. He was on the staff of General FELLGIEBEL, who was Chief of Army Signals, for OKA and OKH. Oberst. MÜGGE was wounded in Russia, where he was the commander of a signal troop for a panzer corps. He was in the Polish war on the staff of General FELLGIEBEL. After being wounded in Russia he was assigned to Abt. 7, which was the Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung. He remained with Abt. 7 until he became commander of radio intelligence troops against the orient in the autumn of 1942.
2. His staff was located in Athens, with outstations in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He had two companies, Nos. 5 and 6, Feste Nachrichten-aussenstellen (F.N.A.). One was located in Athens, with outstations in Crete and Africa, the other in Varda, with outstation in Saloniki. The Saloniki outstation was later somewhere in S. Bulgaria. With these two companies were incorporated two Morch-kompanien, two Peilkompanien and one Auswertestelle. They read all the Mihailovic traffic, plain code, simple substitutions and simple transposition. He could give no details of systems, but said that Oblt. Wollnoy was in charge of the Yugoslav section. They also worked on Turkish police and naval traffic, and the de Gaulle systems (in Syria). He did not know any of the systems, he was only a signals officer, not a cryptographer. There was not much Turkish A/T, they had no need of it as they could use land lines. He had one D/F station in Africa under the command of Rommel's panzer corps, at Mersa Matruh. This troop was made up of very good men, but the results were not good, as there was only a north-south line.
3. He did not work on allied military systems, as this was done by Rommel's company under Capt. Habel. This man was the successor to Seeborn, who had been captured in N. Africa.
4. Shortly before the landing in N. Africa he went to Berlin to try and get stations set up in N. Africa to establish an east-west line in case of an Allied landing. While there, Rommel was driven back, and he made the alternative plan of setting up stations in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete etc. He was told this was unnecessary, as an allied landing was not possible. The next day the Allies landed. Then Gen. FELLGIEBEL came to Berlin, and agreed with him, saying these stations were absolutely necessary. FELLGIEBEL called up MARTINI, head of the G.A.F. "Y" service, and Gen. MARTINI ordered MÜGGE to set up a station in Sicily to co-operate with G.A.F. At this time there were no army troops in Sicily. The G.A.F. headquarters were in Taormina. MÜGGE took 70 of his best men from Athens to Marsala, as listening was better there than in Taormina. They had excellent successes against the Americans, especially on radiotelephony, as the Americans in Tunis had very bad radio discipline, and did all their talking by radiotelephony. His staff was insufficient to cover the wide variety of material, and he was forbidden to take more staff to that area, so they had to work two twelve-hour shifts instead of three eight-hour ones. The entire work was against the American

- army and army air liaison officers.
5. Asked whether they worked on enciphered traffic, he replied that this was unnecessary, as there was so much unenciphered; the systems were very simple.
 6. He asked to transfer his troops from Athens to Sicily, as Athens was not having any success. He wanted to work from Sicily or Rome and cover the whole Mediterranean from there. He was then named Commander Nr 7, with headquarters in Rome. A new man took over command of Nr 4 at Athens. This was on 1st February 1943. He was refused permission to withdraw his troops from Athens. The command was divided, Athens covering the east, and Nr 7 covering the south. There were two companies in the south of France, at Montpellier, near Marseilles. There were to be a Morokkompanie and an Auswertestelle at Frankfurt-am-Main. These were supposed to be ready on 1st February, but actually came in bit by bit. He had one platoon in Sicily. The Mabel company (No. 621) now came under his command. He wanted a company to go to Sicily, but this was not allowed. On his own responsibility he gradually assembled one company in Marsala. This company was ready by 15th February. Company No. 621 worked on the English 8th Army, and the troops in Sicily against the Americans.
 7. He foresaw co-operation between the English and Americans, and realised the necessity of rapid communication between his own troops. He was the first to use extensive radio communication between his own companies. His staff was at Rocca di Papa, near Frascati, and he worked with the Italians there, who were under the intelligence, not the signals, and this gave them too much work, as they had to interrogate prisoners and carry on intelligence activities. There were very close relations between the Italians and the German companies. For all practical purposes he was in charge of the Italian companies.
 8. Asked how he trained telephone intercept operators, he said they first went to an interpreters' school which was first at Halle and later at Meissen. Their practical training came in the field, as they had to become familiar with dialects, abbreviations and operators' idiosyncracies. Good experienced men were very rare, and at a premium. Newcomers worked with the good men until they were broken in. He brought men over from Frankfurt am Main, and gradually built up a good organisation.
 9. Now they had splendid success. The Americans at first were very careless having had less experience than the English, who were very cautious. The Americans later adopted British procedure, much to his disgust.
 10. His greatest success in the whole campaign occurred in the following way. On the 14th March he heard an order to small units ordering radio silence until 2200 hrs. on 17th March. He argued that this meant there was a great move coming, and went to Kesselring's chief of staff, who would not listen to him. When he got back he heard a second message, and later a third. Nobody at 1-C was convinced, so he forced his way in to Kesselring. The next day Kesselring flew to Africa and made complete plans for the defence. Muegge then prayed that the English would move, and on the night of the 16th they did attack. This was the biggest success derived entirely from careless radio procedure. There was not much American activity at this time.
 11. Another incident: By W/T they got news that there was a supply bottleneck in a Wadi with a disguised name. As there were only a few wadis they guessed the logical one and obtained immediate air reconnaissance which confirmed the assumption. Half an hour later the bombers attacked

the Wadi and the British then gave them further confirmation by stating that they had been attacked. The traffic at this time was all plain R/T with place-name cover.

12. At this time Major HERTZER took over his Auswartungsstelle, so that he himself had less work to do. They were very successful and had good co-operation from KESSELRING, who used the information received very quickly and understood its value. Because of these successes he got more equipment and men with which to build up his organization in time for the Tunisian campaign. At this time he had D/F control at Rome, with stations in Montpellier and Sicily, another control, in Western Sicily with stations in Sardinia and Tunis, and a third was HABEL'S company with outstations in Sicily and Crete. Stations were of two types: Kommandopfeiler which worked on one frequency only, and another type to which instructions could be flashed to jump onto a particular frequency. There was difficulty in covering all the frequencies. The Americans used medium and short wave, whereas the British used short wave. The German Army D/F sets were built for long or for short wave, none of which handled a great enough range. The G.A.F. had a good set (70 F) which covered both. He "borrowed" two of these and forgot to give them back. The Army sets were more nobile but not good otherwise. They were developing better sets which were not ready at that time, but which they received for the Italian campaign. They were then just as good as the Luftwaffe sets but more mobile. He preferred reliability to mobility. The U.S. was far ahead of them due to the work of radio amateurs on short-wave traffic, whereas in Germany this was suppressed for security reasons.
13. When the U.S. and British forces joined, he put all his troops together and had a big outfit.
14. At Gabes he was able to report from British conversations that they had discovered the German camouflaged defenses and had counted the trucks from windshield reflections. The camouflaged positions had been recognized through men standing up on them. In addition rum had just been issued to the English troops, and from this he reasoned that an attack was imminent. The area west of Gabes was swampy and the Germans had constructed a ditch to make it further impassable. Because of British interest in these defenses he tried to convince Kesselring that the attack would be straight through the swamp. Kesselring insisted that the English would go around it. The next morning the British attacked straight through and advanced 15 km. After the link-up the combined procedure was very good, and discipline was excellent, much to his disgust. At this time he used radio T/P for his communications, as the landlines were very poor. There was only one coastal cable. He thought they should have used radio T/P from the beginning, but it was only as they had successes that they got good equipment.
15. During this time both the airforce and army were under Kesselring, but Luftflotte 2 had its own Nachrichtenaufklarung under Oberst. ROSENKRANZ, who was also engaged in jamming. They had an exchange of results but there was not much of common interest. When Richtofen took over the G.A.F., he wanted MUGGE to take the G.A.F. M.A. as well, but he did not want it. (At this point MUGGE began to speak of the Sicilian landings, which they had expected to come off earlier, and of which they had once given a false alarm, but he then recalled that he had omitted to speak of the Tunisian campaign.)
16. During the latter part of the Tunisian campaign, HABEL'S company and the Italian company worked together, while the company which MUGGE had brought to Africa worked as Nahaufkl. for the Heeresgruppe. They had good success and at one time he was able to give Kesselring a more accurate picture of the German positions, from Allied sources, than the Germans themselves had.

At the close of the campaign he was not allowed to take his troops out, but he got the good men out by giving them leave and then returning them to Italy, to his headquarters in Rome.

17. He had extensive radio communications using a duplex system which was so rapid that it amounted to a telephone conversation. He would telephone from his villa in Rocca di Papa; the operator would send and receive an answer which was communicated to him over the phone in the same conversation. At the last minute he got permission to remove his men from Africa (Kesselring signed a blank order for this purpose) but it was too late. American troops had overrun the airfield. However all equipment was destroyed. At this time he found that some very good Naval equipment was being sent to Africa from Naples. He persuaded the Naval authorities to trade him this equipment for his equipment in Africa; this protected the Navy from loss in transit, and had the same effect for MÜgge as if he had got his stuff out.
18. When the Americans made practice landings on the islands off Tunisia, he had one D/F broken down and the other being moved from Sicily across the Straits of Messina. Consequently he had only a single bearing from his Sardinian Station. This passed across the tip of Sicily and caused him to give a false alarm of landings in Sicily, which "annoyed the old man". They had no warning of the true landing on Sicily.

SECOND INTERROGATION p.m. 16.6.45. OKM SIGNAL SCHOOL

Subject: Oberst. MÜGGE, with Sonderführer Dr. FRICKE present.

Present: Major Seaman, A.U.S.
Capt. Royffe, I.C.
Lt. Kirby. A.U.S.

19. MÜgge was asked about work of NA 7 on the large French Hagelin. He knew nothing about this, but said they "had captured a small French Hagelin and therefore were able to read all the traffic". This was used on the big links only, in the summer of 1943. They had good success but the content was not interesting. He believed they read all the traffic. We asked what methods were used, and Dr. FRICKE broke in to say that they could read all messages from 1940 on in Berlin, and they sent the keys out to NA 7. They did not need depths, as they knew the common beginnings and K was used as a word spacer. This machine was the C-36 with fixed lugs on the drum. For the American Hagelin with moveable lugs, depth was needed. The American machine was broken only occasionally.
20. MÜGGE then resumed his story. He heard on the radio that British troops were approaching the Straits of Messina and predicted a crossing soon. He had at this time one D/F at Reggio Calabria and one in the heel of Italy. There was also a platoon near Salerno. His men had advance warning of the American landing on the toe but did not report this to him as they were afraid it was only another exercise. He moved his troops to Salerno until the English landing there. Then he took them to Rocca di Papa. The Allied discipline had now been so much improved that intercept was very difficult. The Americans had learned to work as cautiously as the British. They sometimes learned of movements by covering railway traffic dealing with supplies. At this time they learned from the English that the Italian King had changed & des. They moved to Civita Castellano.

21. He described the Rundsprüche. He had direct communications with the Corps, but the divisions wanted his results as well, so he broadcast them. This was very good, especially for giving warning of air or artillery attacks. In order to make sure that only his divisions got the information, he used short waves, 50 and 70 watt transmitters, later 80 watt transmitters on middle wave.
22. He left Italy in November 1943 after an attack of jaundice. After a few weeks in the hospital and a tour in Berlin during which he advised on the setting up of RI in the West, he went to France as Nachrichtenführer of the 15th Armee. In France he improvised some R.I troops, though this was not his job. By this means he got news of air and artillery attacks in the campaign in France and the Low Countries. 15 Armee line ran from 7 km. west of Le Havre to Antwerp and Vlissingen. In Holland he got an RI platoon, and in Germany a company. He got his best results from our Air liaison officers. He covered both R/T and W/T with emphasis on the former. He had no decipherers supplied to him and was obliged to improvise some. His RI set up in Germany was between Bonn and Düsseldorf, where conditions for reception were very good. During the Bulge battle he had to shift some of his men to that area, where conditions were very poor. Finally he moved South where the conditions were impossible, due to the Eifel Mts. In March 1945 he became ill and went to Berlin for a few weeks. He was supposed to reorganise the railway traffic, of which he knew nothing, but instead was appointed Nachrichtenführer of Heeresgruppe NW, on 1st April 1945, under Field Marshal BUSCH. This is his present title.
23. He was asked whether information from R/T during tank attacks could be made use of. He said it could not, normally, but that tank attacks could be predicted from changes in volume of traffic collated with other information. This T/A was done especially on supply traffic. Sometimes the short-wave tank R/T in Africa could be heard freakishly in Rome.
24. Names of offices, divisions, brigades etc., were indexed when mentioned on the air. This sometimes enabled them to check on the movements of units.
25. Oberst. MÜGGE stated that his wife was Swedish, is now in Sweden, and he would like to go to Sweden to recover from his leg amputation, and become a Swede. He said there was nothing more for him to do in Germany.

THIRD INTERROGATION p.m. 17.6.45.

OKM SIGNALS SCHOOL

Subject: Oberst. MÜGGE.

Present: Cdr. Dudley Smith R.N.
Lt. Cdr. Forster. R.N.V.R.

26. MÜGGE was asked about the liaison between Na. 4 and the Luftwaffe Sigint. organisation at Athens. There was an exchange of technical and intelligence results between them. Colonel ROSENKRANTZ, an old friend of MÜGGE'S had been in charge of the G.A.F. sigint. set-up there. ROSENKRANTZ was a signals officer and in no way technical specialist although as a higher officer he had to know a good deal about technical matters. ROSENKRANTZ was at present living at the village of AUSACHER, near FLENSBURG.
27. Na. 4 at Athens did not possess Hollerith machinery although the G.A.F. did. MÜGGE knew that Hollerith was employed by the OKH Cryptographers at Berlin and by the Italians at Rome. (Obtained from the Germans)

28. Many allied cypher books and publications were captured in the Mediterranean theatre. MÜGGE could nor remember any details. They were given to his local cryptographers and then sent to Berlin.
29. MÜGGE knew of no allied cypher machines captured in North Africa. He was certain that none were obtained subsequently to 1st February, 1943, when Captain HABEL'S unit, NEAK 621, joined his command. HABEL was now a prisoner in the U.S.A. It was possible that such a capture could have occurred in 1942, say, before MÜGGE came to the South East, but he had never heard of it. They only had a small French machine of Swedish origin.
30. MÜGGE had not heard of the capture of any British cypher machine keys in North Africa, but in any case his party did not possess the machines and would not be particularly interested.
31. The standing instructions were that all intercepted traffic which could not be decyphered on the spot was to be forwarded to the next highest authority (in his case Berlin) and he believes all the machine traffic was so dealt with. None of the intelligence results from their own intercepts ever came back to them specifically as such. The Leitstelle Nachrichtenaufklärung of Foreign Armies West, Berlin, sent out periodical intelligence summaries in which the items were unclassified as to origin and might have been from Agents or any other source. Normally reports in the Army were classified "SQ" for Agents ((sic)), and "VN" for Cryptography. The latter was possibly used for other sources as well.
32. MÜGGE had never heard of any OKH successes with high grade British machine cyphers and his impression was that no success at all had been achieved. The raw material was regarded as of no particular importance. In any case the Enigma was absolutely unbreakable and in German opinion the same considerations applied to the high grade British machines.
33. He stated that there was a great deal of technical communication between his cryptographers and BERLIN, he did not himself follow the details but the contents largely concerned book-building. He did not know the names or details of the numerous codes involved. He thought the British Army 3-figure, 4-figure and 5-figure codes were all worked on with success but could not commit himself specifically.
34. He was unaware of any study having been made of allied wireless silences on the Western Front.